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Modernism’s Lost Future
“The past is normally depicted by a series of meta-
phors whose material is the present.”
Roman Jakobson1
“What has become of the social, ethical, and religious activism of the early years 
of the November Group?”2 asked art critic Ernő Kállai3 in a 1929 article marking 
the tenth anniversary of the group’s founding in Berlin. He particularly missed 
the November Group as “a major collective undertaking” that was meant to 
model a future collective work. His question is a resounding confirmation of 
an earlier statement, that “the age of ferment, of ‘isms’ is over […]. We are wit-
nessing a time of professional consolidation and absorption in objective, expert 
work.”4 At the time of writing this Kállai was employed at the Dessau Bauhaus 
as editor of the school’s journal, and had plenty of experience of the vanishing 
of modernism’s idealist spirit, and the onset of a colder, business-like, matter-
of-fact approach to the creative work.
Today modernism is history that generates, in many, criticism as well as nostal-
gia. It was taken for granted for many long decades that studies in modernism 
and the avant-gardes dominated the cultural history of the post-World War II 
1 Roman Jakobson, “Dada,” Vestnik Teatr (Theatrical herald), 1921, 82; trans. Stephen Rudy, 
in Roman Jakobson, My Futurist Years, New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1992, 63.
2 Ernő Kállai, “Zehn Jahre Novembergruppe,” Der Kunstnarr, April 1929, n. p. trans. David 
Britt, in Between Worlds. A Sourcebook of Central European Avant-Gardes 1910-1930 [here-
after: BW], eds. Timothy O. Benson, Éva Forgács, Cambridge, Mass., Los Angeles: The MIT 
Press and LACMA, 2002, 718.
3 Ernő Kállai (1890-1954) was a Hungarian art critic who lived and worked in Germany from 
1920 to 1935. He contributed such journals as Das Kunstblatt, Die Weltbühne, Sozialistische 
Monatshefte, Jahrbuch der jungen Kunst, bauhaus, that he edited from 1928 to 1930, and 
others. He collaborated with Hungarian artist, poet and editor Lajos Kassák, and contrib-
uted, among other Hungarian venues, his journals Ma (Today) and Munka (Work).
4 Ernő Kállai, “Ideológiák alkonya” (The twilight of Ideologies), 365, April 19-20, 1925, trans. 
John Bátki, BW, 615.
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period. It was a matter of course: focusing on modernism was as much a moral 
as a professional choice of historians. After the ashes left behind by the War it 
was their duty to pick up the pieces of the broken culture of modernity that had 
been lost to Nazism, Stalinism, and the War itself. Historians and theorists who 
worked to re-establish modernism’s continuity and relevance, and researched it 
in details, disregarded the vast mass of anti-modern output for a long time. This 
darker side of the moon has been brought to attention and gotten scrutinized in 
the recent decades.
Reclaiming modernism after 1945, however, also entailed the mending of its for-
mer failure in the second half of the 1920s, a process that had started as early as 
the breakout of the Great War. On the one hand, the actual experience of trench 
warfare derailed the futurists’ fascination with the shiny technological future 
they had anticipated, but, on the other hand, the lesson of World War I fuelled 
further utopian/modernist ideas of internationalism, inspired by the shocking 
lessons of jingoistic warfare and the 1917 Russian Revolution. The mirage of a 
new internationalism pervaded the concepts and the work of the post-World 
War I modernists and the avant-gardes. The second half of the 1920s, however, 
was the time of sobering up after their limitless ambitions and illusions. “Mod-
ernism” and the “avant-gardes” are not synonymous terms, of course. For the 
purposes of this paper “modernism” will be used as the umbrella term of mod-
ern art and the culture of modernity, while the “avant-gardes” as the activist, 
militant vanguard movements within modernism, that pursued clear-cut agen-
das usually articulated in manifestoes. While the avant-gardes were all mod-
ernists, if on the radical side, not all modernists were avant-gardes. The avant-
gardes operated within the modernist cultural space as representatives of some 
of modernism’s quintessential concepts, for example their claim to the future. 
Modernists and their fighting units, the avant-gardes, had exiled themselves into 
the future since Count Saint-Simon first outlined a future state that will employ 
the avant-garde artists as the state’s official communicators with the populace. 
Throughout the hundred years stretching from the mid-19th to the mid-20th cen-
turies, modernism and the avant-gardes were consistently future-bound. Mod-
ernism was power-art, both when reflecting the actual power of the modernizing 
bourgeoisie and when opposing it in the name of a yet to be established new so-
cial order and new culture that the modernists would create through the avant-
garde movements. The modernist artist claimed to have a mandate, either from 
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the dominant social groups or from their energetic progressive opposition. Mod-
ernism’s universal claim to the future was expressed not only in the term “futur-
ism”. Conquering the future on a cosmic scale was expressed in the title Victory 
Over the Sun, Aleksei Kruchenkih, Mikhail Matyushin, Kazimir Malevich and 
Velimir Khlebnikov’s 1913 futurist opera as well as in Giacomo Balla and Fortu-
nato Depero’s 1915 manifesto The Futurist Reconstruction of the Universe, to cite 
only two of the most obvious and grand examples of the cosmic conquest that 
modernists felt imminent. The anticipation of lingering epochal changes in the 
Russian society and then the historic fact of the Russian revolution, fast-paced 
progress in sciences and new technologies as well as, among other things, the 
success of early aviation fuelled the sensation that mankind’s wildest dreams 
were being redeemed, and the future was within reach. Malevich declared that 
he had already relocated into the future, leaving behind “the blue lampshade of 
color limitations,” and calling: “after me, comrade aviators!”5
More meticulous and pragmatic designs and concepts also abounded in the first 
two and a half decades of the twentieth century. The participants of De Stijl, the 
Bauhaus, and Russian constructivism, the circles of the journals L’Esprit Nou-
veau and ABC Beiträge zum Bauen worked on buildings and objects that peo-
ple could actually use in the near future. Housing projects, interior design, new 
typography and modern fashion design from Tatlin and Varvara Stepanova to 
Balla6 and Sonia Delaunay were equally propositions for an anticipated change 
in the way of life, now in the frame of a socially and technologically advanced, 
soon-to-be realized new world. 
Modernism’s vision and anticipation of the future both artistically and discursive-
ly, was confronted by past-bound regenerative trends that had a massive presence 
since the end of the nineteenth century and saw themselves not less revolutionary 
than the modernists. The myth of the fascist “new man” touting violence and fun-
damentalism, as theorized by Georges Sorel (1847-1922) and his successors7 was 
5 Malevich, “Suprematism,” April 1919, in Malevich on Suprematism, Six Essays: 1915 to 
1926, ed. Patricia Railing, Iowa City: The University of Iowa, 1999, 46.
6 See Giacomo Balla, “Futurist Men’s Clothing: A Manifesto,” 1914, in Futurism. An Anthol-
ogy, eds. Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, Laura Wittman, New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2009, 194-195.
7 Mark Antliff, Avant-Garde Fascism. The Mobilization of Myth, Art, and Culture in France, 
1909-1939, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007, 2.
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the counterpart of El Lissitzky’s utopian New Man in his 1923 portfolio version 
of Victory Over the Sun. The implication of modernist artists and even some of 
the representatives of the avant-gardes in the nascent fascist myth-making that 
projected a “fascist revolution” in the period between 1909 and 19398 has been 
the object of more detailed research since the 1990s, resulting in a more layered 
and complicated concept of modernism than the previously held image, which 
focused exclusively on the presence of the progressive features of modernity and 
the avant-gardes. Considering the anti-democracy, anti-capitalism, extreme na-
tionalism and conservatism of these movements, it appears that the 1920s rap-
pel à l’ordre should not have come as a surprise. But it did: in contemporary 
criticism as well as in later historiography. Benjamin D. Buchloh gives a detailed 
discussion of what he calls regression to figurative painting in a 1981 essay,9 not 
hesitating to call the post-1915 developments the first “collapse of the modernist 
idiom” that he saw as a cautionary tale at the time of writing, and which is just 
as relevant today:
The question for us now is to what extent the rediscovery and recapitulation of 
these modes of figurative representation […] reflect and dismantle the ideological 
impact of growing authoritarianism; or to what extent they simply indulge and 
reap the benefits of this increasingly apparent political practice; or, worse yet, 
to what extent they cynically generate a cultural climate of authoritarianism to 
familiarize us with the political realities to come.10
This insight raises several questions: What exactly was getting lost when the for-
mer futurists and cubists resorted to figurative expression? Did they become, in 
Clement Greenberg’s terms, producers of kitsch by giving up the avant-garde’s 
demanding and critical position? Did they convert to the market? Did they re-
gress to an easily understandable, populist visual language, as Buchloh sug-
gests? Were they complicit in bringing on authoritarian neo-classicism?
These questions imply that modernism was the opposite of kitsch, the market, 
populism, and authoritarian neo-classicism. However, it was not only the neo-
8 For detailed discussion see op. cit.
9 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Figures of Authority, Ciphers of Regression,” October, no. 16 
(Spring 1981), 39-68; reprinted in Art After Modernism: Rethinking Representation, ed. Bri-
an Wallis, New York: The New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1984, 107-134.
10 Ibid., 108.
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classicist style of Mussolini’s Novecento, the Nazis, and Socialist Realism that 
filled with the spirit of a new order the forms of age-old classicism: the “rhetoric 
of power”11 haunted the future-bound modernists’ formal language as well, if 
not in the neo-classical style, but geometric abstraction. Seeking collective spir-
it in artistic expression to overcome the national and individual particularities 
in the wake of World War I, modernist aspirations turned away from expression-
ism and looked for its antithesis in art12. The new art of the future, the modern-
ists were convinced, had to leave behind subjectivism, and be equally valid and 
understandable for all, displaying images of a common future. The most clearly 
overarching formal elements were the purely geometric ones, although very dif-
ferent philosophies generated them from theosophy to communism to suprema-
tist metaphysics. Surveying the new art of the first post-World War I years Kállai 
discerned the anti-expressionist, anti-subjectivist tendencies that he attributed 
to the spirit of a future collectivism and labeled objectivism in spring 1921. He 
described the most progressive art as constructions (even if he could have hardly 
heard the term from Moscow, as it was just emerging there), that 
have created new space for the style of the twentieth century, which has lost met-
aphysics and illusions, but is unstoppable and progressive in technology and its 
civilization. […] We don’t need to go as far as art. What a great classicism: clear, 
transparent order, subtlety, beauty of form and movement we see in the system of 
modern machines! How much earthly, human dignity is in the proud verticality 
of the factories, the cruising of steamships, the flight of airplanes, the arches of 
the bridges!13
11 For the implications of early twentieth century geometric abstraction that the minimalists 
of the 1970s considered their model, see Anna C. Chave, “Minimalism and the Rhetoric of 
Power,” Arts Magazine, Vol. 64, No. 5 (January 1990), 44-63.
12 Modernism’s flirtation with classicism goes back to even earlier times the discussion of 
which would go beyond the scope of the present paper. The Hungarian modernist ten-
dencies of the first decade of the twentieth century that blended cubism and expression-
ism, were welcomed by Georg Lukács as “the art of the old times” in his programmatic 
1910 article, “Az Utak Elváltak,” Nyugat III/3 (February 1910): 190-193; English transla-
tion: “The Ways Have Parted,” English translation by George Cushing, in BW 125-129 in 
The Lukács Reader, ed. Arpad Kadarkay, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, 167-173. For more on 
the subject, see Éva Forgács, “The Safe Haven of a New Classicism. The Quest for a New 
Aesthetics in Hungary 1904-1912,” Studies in East European Thought, No. 60, 2008.
13 Ernő Kállai, “Új művészet” (New art), Part II, Ma, Vienna, Aug. 1, 1921, 115. My translation.
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The unapologetic use of the term “classicism” for what he describes as cutting 
edge modernity and the fusion of art and life in objects that attest to the techni-
cal and aesthetic ingenuity of the modern man, indicates that in spite of the 
sharply contrasting concepts there was a rhetorical and formal overlap between 
the languages of the modernists and the regenerative traditionalists. Kállai na-
ively used the word “classicist” to express his admiration for a regained order 
over what, at that point, appeared to him, and many modernists, as chaotic and 
deliberate subjectivism and bourgeois individualism. Leaning toward techno-
logical constructions and machine aesthetics, that became the staple of progres-
sive abstract art for the next years, was also a reaction to the chaos of the war 
and the widely spread modernist desire to build the new, international world 
on rational and socially egalitarian foundations. That is, new art of a new or-
der. Deleting the past is emphatically underlined in many programmatic works 
from Victory Over the Sun to a number of manifestos. The vision of a collectivist 
future found expression in the simple geometric forms and pure colours of the 
modernist aesthetic. However, Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Russia and Mussolini’s 
Italy were equally anti-individualist, and also ushered in a certain degree of 
modernization: the former two in technologies, the latter also in style. Relative-
ly permissive in visual expression and architecture, Fascist Italy complicates 
our concepts of modernism. As Emily Frances Braun points out, it “overturns 
longstanding presumptions that the modes of abstraction, non-objective art, 
or expressionism were the sole purview of liberal or left wing exponents. In 
Fascist Italy, modernism, as well as tradition, were employed to the ends of 
anti-democratic politics.”14 Such overlap occurred in leftwing and right-wing 
populist phraseology, too. For example the Bauhaus’s second director Hannes 
Meyer, a left-wing, self-described “scientific Marxist” programmatically used 
terms like “Volksseele,” “Volksinteresse,” “Volksgemeinschaft”—also key 
terms in Nazi talk.15 
By the mid-1920s Neue Sachlichkeit ruled, along with a “shift to allegorical 
mode”16 and a turn of the futurist and cubist painting to what Buchloh calls “au-
14 Emily Frances Braun, “The Modernity of Tradition: The Fine Arts in Fascist Italy 1919-
1929,” in Reinterpreting the Past. Traditionalist Artistic Trends in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope of the 1920s and 1930s, ed. Irena Kossowska, Warsaw: Institute of Art of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 2010, 46.
15 Hannes Meyer, “bauhaus und gesellschaft,” bauhaus zeitschrift 1929/1, 20.
16 Buchloh, 112.
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thoritarian neo-classicism.” Modernist product design was highly successful on 
the market and became fashionable, but was stripped of the utopian social vi-
sions of the early 1920s. El Lissitzky returned to Moscow in 1925; Walter Gropius 
and László Moholy-Nagy left the Bauhaus early in 1928; Theo van Doesburg died 
in 1931; Hitler came to power in 1933; and Socialist Realism was declared man-
datory in the Soviet Union in 1934. Thus, years before World War II the modern 
imagination and the confident faith of the modernists in shaping and owning 
the future was suppressed and disappeared from sight. The power that the mod-
ernist and the avant-garde artist had thought to possess evaporated. As Buchloh 
points out,
The Harlequins, Pierrots, Bajazzos and Pulcinelles invading the work of Picasso, 
Beckmann, Severini, Derain and others in the early twenties (and, in the mid-thir-
ties, even the work of the former constructivist/productivist Rodchenko in Russia) 
can be identified as ciphers of an enforced regression. They serve as emblems for 
the melancholic infantilism of the avant-garde artist who has come to realize his 
historical failure. The clown functions as a social archetype of the artist as an es-
sentially powerless, docile, entertaining figure […].17
If regression in the 1920s materialized, among other things, in the figure of the 
clown, it still found in the clown a long time cultural symbol condensing a rich 
poetic, dramatic and literary tradition, quite unlike today’s plush bunnies and 
Barbie dolls. The clown was still the emblem of the modernist artist who created 
art as an alternative to the world of power even when he was left powerless.
An early confession of the lost future appeared in a 1923 Soviet short story, in 
which the director of a salt mine explains to a painter what the murals of the 
new theatre, which was formerly the mine’s church, have to represent. The pic-
tures will show the changed life of man, with physical labour done by machines, 
natural catastrophes controlled by the power of the liberated human intellect, 
man overcoming the powers of the cosmos as well as human emotions that had 
divided humankind. But he soon receives a letter from a friend that brings him 
back to the present: 
17 Buchloh, 118.
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I will not hesitate […] I will shoot myself in the head. […] We have shot, crushed, 
and destroyed everything that even vaguely resembled the past. We have leaped 
ahead a thousand years, a millennium separated us from those we killed. […] In 
brief, I struggled against time and space. I wanted to make the future present. 
This had seemed possible in those panic-stricken, confused years when time 
seemed to vanish, but now that the panic has subdued, life again proceeds in 
time and space. And even if space can be conquered, time cannot. Life is, once 
again, ruled by the same old things: love, money, and glory.18 
Such early reckoning with the futility and irreality of the expectations attached 
to the future was rare in the mostly optimistic early 1920s. Four decades later, 
in the wake of World War II hope in a better world had to prevail, the more so, 
because the horrors of that war had to be forgotten. The human losses of World 
War II and the Nazi Holocaust were beyond comprehension and expression. All 
efforts had to be directed at the future. Thus the return of modernism to the 
mainstream of Western art and historiography after 1945 more than ever before, 
was inevitable, and modernity’s position in the centre of the culture, now in-
vested with a retroactive anti-war and anti-fascism stance, was confirmed for 
several decades. Modernism, once again highly politicized, was also a reference 
point for the anti-capitalist movements of the 1950s and 1960s, including various 
groups of the New Left. The period from 1956, when many Western communists 
found the Soviet Union’s crushing the Hungarian uprising inacceptable and 
abandoned their respective communist parties generating the New Left, was the 
run-up to the intoxicating 1960s that culminated in 1968. This decade brought 
the rediscovery of the Russian avant-garde and, along with it, the rediscovery 
of the modernism and the avant-gardes of the 1920s both East and West.19 The 
utopian and internationalist contents of modernism put the artist, once again, 
in the role of a potential leader who can serve as a guide into the future—suffice 
it to point at the figure of Joseph Beuys and the role he assumed as a leader and 
18 Mikhail Slonimsky, “The Emery Machine,” 1923, in Kegyetlen szerelem (Cruel love, an 
anthology), Budapest: Európa Kiadó, 1963, translated from János Elbert’s Hungarian to 
English by the author and John Bátki. Russian original: Mikhail Leonidovich Slonimskiĭ, 
Mashina Ėmeri, Moscow: Ateneĭ, 1924.
19 For a detailed discussion of the integration of the Soviet-Russian avant-garde into the mas-
ter narrative of Western art, see Éva Forgács, “How the New Left Invented East-European 
Art,” in Blindheit und Hellsichtigkeit. Künstlerkritik an Politik und Gesellschaft der Gegen-
wart, ed. Cornelia Klinger, Wiener Reihe. Themen der Philosophie, Bd. 16, Berlin: Verlag 
Walter de Gruyter, 2014.
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organizer with the wide support of followers and the media. The cult of modern-
ism entailed inquiry into history, and more: the need to construct the relevant 
narrative of modernism. It entailed, furthermore, that knowledge of social and 
political history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, music and literature were, to a de-
gree as high as possible, indispensable for understanding modernism. 
This scale of competence supported the concept of the sustained relevance of 
modernism, its high standards and tenet of unfailing progress, projected into the 
future until modernism’s crisis and demise starting in the late 1970s and around 
the early 1980s. Exactly at the time when Buchloh wrote his essay on the regres-
sive anti-modern tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s that he appropriately tied to 
the present, the myth of modernism was fading out and was seen as the more 
and more irrelevant. Almost suddenly everything was questioned: who exactly 
is the artist, in whose name is he actually speaking, and what is he representing 
beside his own private self? At about this time modernism, and, along with it, 
the artist lost power and social mandate, for a number of reasons that need yet 
to be spelled out. One of these reasons was that the culture’s focus shifted from 
the future to the present (and the past as well), so the ground fell out from below 
the modernist visions. A case in point is the ubiquity of the theme, and, indeed, 
the myth, of childhood in a lot of the visual art of the 1980s and 90s, when plush 
toys, dolls, toy cars and other childhood objects flooded the exhibition rooms. 
In contrast to modernism’s vision of a shared future these objects and images 
tell private stories and personal memories of the past, or offer critical comments 
on the present in exceedingly private language. They display personal history 
instead of a common future, or tell narratives in allegorical language. 
Although I would like to point out the ubiquity of toys in the 1980s and 1990s 
as indicative of a paradigm shift from the ‘adult’ modernist to the vulnerable 
transmodernist who discovered the child in his or her self, it would not be right 
to claim that toys and the theme of childhood first appeared in the art world and 
literature during this period. The idea and cult of childhood first appeared as 
instant critique of the Enlightenment. Even before Kant argued for mankind’s 
newly acquired maturity that “the public use of one’s reason”20 warrants for, 
the anti-rationalist concept of the child as genius, free of the corruption perpe-
20 Immanuel Kant: “What Is Enlightenment?” in Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1959, 87.
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trated by the culture, was introduced by Rousseau and was further cultivated by 
Goethe. Generations of reform pedagogues based their methods on saving the 
“innate genius” of children. Romanticism saw childhood as the entirety of the 
possibilities any human being has ahead in life. Freud and Proust, the expres-
sionists, and the surrealists were all intent on fathoming childhood. The child 
was discovered inside the adult as the bottom of his ego, his primitive, authen-
tic, primordial core of uncorrupted sensitivity. 
In the 1980s, however, self-pity and narcissism were in the air: one had only to 
recognize their visual expressions21. René Ricard depicted his favourite Franc-
esco Clemente painting in his 1981 essay “The Radiant Child.”22 He singled out a 
Clemente picture of a frog in a green pond as the “preservation of a lost moment 
from childhood, perfectly seen and remembered in a flash”, and claimed that 
it was exactly this flashed childhood moment that “sets this picture apart as 
art.”23 But he was most of all moved by Keith Haring’s picture The Radiant Child. 
“We are the radiant child and have spent our lives defending that little baby, 
constructing an adult around it to protect it from the unlisted signals of forces 
we have no control over. We are that little baby, the radiant child […].”24 Ricard is 
claiming back the Winnicotian “true self,” lost amidst the maturing process and 
the worldly operations of “false self” adults. Also importantly, in contrast to the 
modernist attitude of being in charge and control, he points to “forces we have 
no control over,” admitting the powerlessness of the artist. 
By the end of the 1980s this narcissistic melodrama gave way to a more sophis-
ticated and more educated critique that I would call transmodern, in order to 
express a complexity and an attitude that do not come across from the term 
postmodern. Transmodern combined sociological, psychological, anthropo-
logical and even educational awareness but dismissed their significance as a 
kind of tangential, secondary feature, while exuding alarming vulnerability, 
thus making it clear that being armed with knowledge and psycho-analytical 
21 Naturally, there is never a clear-cut divide when it comes to motifs. Childhood and the 
childlike appeared as themes much earlier in the work of Hans Bellmer and Joseph Cor-
nell, as well as, for example, the work of Christian Boltanski in the 1960s. These occur-
rences were, however, isolated.
22 René Ricard, “The Radiant Child,” Artforum, December 1981, 38.
23 Ricard, 38.
24 Ibid., 45.
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literacy were of little help for the artist in asserting his social position or secur-
ing a stronghold in life. Everything that made the modernist artist powerful no 
longer worked for the transmodernist of the 1980s and 1990s. This came across, 
for example, the 1990 group exhibition The Pathetic Aesthetic,25 “a blunt aes-
thetic of failure, embarrassment and thumping degradation,” as Los Angeles 
art critic Christopher Knight described it, coining the term Patheticism for it.26 
“Pathetic art is adamantly anti-idealistic,” Knight concludes, “Rather than en-
visioning utopias […]. Patheticism simply makes do with what is. And ‘what is’ 
is frequently a mess. It embraces all those quietly horrific feelings one has gone 
to great if unwitting lengths to repress from memory.”27
Transmodern—a more inclusive term than Patheticism, by analogy of the Italian 
term of the same years, transavanguardia— was tired of modernism’s ambitions, 
achievements, and its claim for moral high-grounds, and expressed it through 
choosing private topics, marginal subject matters, or pathetic junk objects as if 
refraining from mainstream art. At the same time however, along with the pathet-
ic, it displayed a lot of erudition, sophistication, and critique, but conspicuously 
on the sidelines, eschewing making a point or coming up with a big idea. Trans-
modern is cool: it differs from postmodern inasmuch as it points to easily super-
seding and dismissing, rather than just chronologically following modernism. 
Transmodern art was often so sophisticated that at times it appeared as mod-
ernism in disguise. Mike Kelley’s or Annette Messager’s soft toys, for example, 
reflected deep knowledge of the culture, eliciting sexuality, aggression, soli-
tude, and yearning, confronting the actual reality of children, or the sustained 
childlike sensitivity of the artist, to the adults’ rigid, stubbornly upheld image 
of an idealized world of flawless perfection, order and cleanliness. But where 
the modernist artist would have opposed establishment culture and politics 
25 The show as organized by writer Ralph Rugoff in the Rosamund Felsen Gallery in summer 
1990. The participants included Mike Kelley, Raymond Pettibon, John Miller, Georg Her-
ald, and others. I am grateful to Kim Dingle for bringing it, as well as Christopher Knight's 
review, to my attention. 
26 Christopher Knight, “The Pathetic Aesthetic: Making Do With What Is,” Los Angeles Times, 
August 14, 1990.
27 Ibid. Julie Kristeva’s 1980 book Pouvoirs de l’horreur, in English: Powers of Horror. An Essay 
on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, should 
be mentioned in this context, even if a detailed discussion of it would go beyond the scope 
of this essay. 
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by activism, the transmodernist positions himself or herself as a detached ob-
server, if not victim. Kelley, for example, was perplexed by the aggression of 
the adult world against children that manifested, among other things, in gift-
giving. He saw home-made plush toys, supposedly the tokens of love, also as 
impositions of a will on children, a gesture that reflected society’s attitude to 
the individual. Kelley’s transmodern sensitivity perceived the continued power 
struggle in the culture and he sided with the powerless. “If you give this thing 
to Junior,” he said, “he owes you something. It might not be money, but he owes 
you something. The most terrible thing is that he doesn’t know what he owes 
you because there’s no price on the thing.”28 The question is answered by Brian 
Sutton-Smith, who observed that toy objects have had a tendency to replace 
games in children’s lives, and that the toys are designed for solitary occupa-
tion to isolate children from the earliest age on.29 “Although the ‘gift’ is meant 
to bond the child to the parents, the child’s reciprocal obligation is to become 
capable of solitary behaviour. Solitariness is the child’s gift to the parents.”30 
We have come a long way from modernism’s collectivist ideals.
The transmodern is anti-authoritarian and does not have the ambition to step 
up as authority. A case in point is a body of work by Kim Dingle, the Priss Room 
installations (1994). Dingle also plays on the sharp contrast between the cul-
tural facade and the raw, original, precultural reality presented as that of chil-
dren: here two-year-old girls smear feces on the wall and throw violently ripped 
plush toys around. Donning frilly white dresses and black shoes as flawlessly 
cute little girls, the Prisses—prim, cissy and belligerent—clench their tiny fists, 
raring to fight. They explode with the energy of aggression and violence. Hand-
made and dressed by Dingle (and fashioned as caricatured self-portraits), they 
look like miniature beasts of prey, ready for action at any minute. If they have 
a demonic quality about them, it stems, as in Kelley’s works, from the demons 
of our culture. The Prisses’ piercing eyes express little illusion about life being 
a ruthless fight—a physical fight, that is—and they are clearly chomping at the 
bit, taking pleasure in the prospective. And no wonder: pull up their Sunday 
best dresses, and you will find bellies covered with tattoos that are in fact min-
28 Mike Kelley interviewed by John Miller in Los Angeles on March 21, 1991. In Mike Kelley, 
Los Angeles: Art Press, 1992, 18.
29 Brian Sutton-Smith, Toys As Culture, New York: Gardener Press, 1986, especially the chap-
ters “The Toy as Solitariness,” and “The Use of Toys for Isolation.”
30 Ibid., 53.
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iature oil paintings depicting scenes from great American myths: wild battles 
with the native Americans, all horses, whips and guns. The transmodern mes-
sage is: down with the big ideas! Nobody can claim moral high grounds in a 
culture of unending violence.
Nayland Blake’s El Dorado, another 1994 installation31 is an Orwellian vision 
featuring yellow toy rabbits (apparently cloned) as parts of a model-size com-
munity. One rabbit is gleefully smearing some brown substance on the wall, 
another is drawing. One group has constituted an execution squad and is pre-
paring to shoot one of their fellow rabbits; another group is simply playing. One 
rabbit, chased by yet another group, is trying to hide; another lies dead in a 
refrigerator. There seems to be no moral or other scale to differentiate between 
individual actions. Killing is like “playing at execution”, being dead is like 
“playing dead”; drawing may be interrupted for shooting. Since the toy world so 
resembles the real one, there is no clear-cut borderline between feigning an ac-
31 It was on show in Christopher Grimes Gallery, Santa Monica, in 1994.
(left): Kim Dingle, Priss, 1994. Mixed media. 
Courtesy of the artist.
(right): Kim Dingle: Priss Room, 1994. Installa-
tion, mixed media. Courtesy of the artist.
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tion and performing it. The cute little bunny-rabbits, as spotless as Kelley’s toys 
were when first given to a child, act out their little masters’ or their own uncon-
scious ideas and desires in a violent free-for-all. If this is a vision of the future, 
it fundamentally differs from modernism’s concept of an ever-improving, ever 
more advanced future world.
The novelty of the use of toys in the art of the 1980s and 90s, as opposed to 
the way surrealists used them in the 1930s was that they changed the route of 
communication between artist and viewer. Although each artist used them in a 
different way and for different purposes, toys are more objects than representa-
tions. They were not handmade by the artist, nor were they displayed as objets 
trouvés. As mass-produced or serially handcrafted objects they were familiar 
from everyone’s childhood, so it was justified to use them as the lowest com-
mon cultural denominator of at least one generation. They lack the intellectual 
sophistication of the surrealists who addressed the unconscious through sym-
bols so the viewer could intellectually respond to the challenge by deciphering 
them. The artists of the 90s did not address the viewer’s mind. They used the 
viscerality of toys directly to electrify the viewer’s unconscious, this art’s real 
target. The intellectual step between the image and its frame of reference was 
eliminated as another sign of dismissing modernism. While Duchamp’s ready-
mades were carefully chosen objects, so neutral they did not invite any kind 
of identification and stayed halfway between viewer and exhibitor, the toy, by 
contrast to the bicycle wheel, is an object that absorbs both the artist and the 
viewer. Not only does it address the childhood ego, but, by its physical pres-
ence, powerfully reinvigorates it, so that it ceases to be, like other artworks, 
the object of contemplation. Instead, it is recognized as part of the viewer’s 
self. Childhood was discovered in the art of transmodernity as the last com-
mon myth and cultural bond that activates everyone’s private memories. Toys 
invited both artist and viewer, who shared an otherwise not admitted anxiety, 
to regress into pre-verbal childhood. 
The 1980s and 90s didn’t need the art world, though, to put children, with or 
without toys, on display: their images were ubiquitous. Ads in the print media 
and TV commercials quickly grasped the cult of children and childhood, the 
yearning for security, and the emotionalism involved. The media still inces-
santly flash images of infants, toddlers, and children to sell insurance, safe 
cars, retirement plans, to mention only a few typical items. Images of security 
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and images of happy childhood have grown inseparable, while the exploitation 
of the sexuality, consumer potential, and emotional reverberations related to 
children, have also become ubiquitous. Childhood, as PR experts have real-
ized, has come to be seen as the ultimate safe haven from anxiety. The mul-
tifaceted use of children or the childlike in a multi-layered visual vernacular 
is reflected on in many more artists’ works such as Sally Mann, Charles Ray, 
Nicole Eisenman, Tamara Fites, Tony Oursler, and others. 
Childhood and the personal past were also prominent subject matter in East-
ern Europe in the same decades in art as well as literature. Hungarian painter 
László Fehér, for example, consistently used the motif of childhood memories 
in his reductive compositions. Shadows and transparent figures open the pic-
ture space up to an inner reality while the style-frame is photorealist. Because 
of the local context the topic of childhood, as writer Péter Nádas explained, 
gave an opportunity to generate “subjective time that everyone creates for him-
self; [thus] thematising childhood was a hidden response to schematism and 
the ensuing more sophisticated forms of manipulation.”32 Re-visiting childhood 
32 Péter Nádas, “A gyerekkor: rejtett válasz a sematizmusra” (Childhood: a hidden response 
to schematism), interview with András Görömbei, Alföld, 1977, No. 7, my translation.
László Fehér, Harbour, 1988,oil on canvas. 
Courtesy of the artist.
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helped create personal freedom in the space of the artwork. Even if the topic 
of childhood was an invention against censorship and oppression, it was past-
bound, and served as refuge from the present, unlike modernism’s brave antici-
pation of the future.
Not giving up childhood is a soft resistance of the “essentially powerless” art-
ist, in Buchloh’s words, in the world of hard-edge corporate architecture. “Pow-
erless” seems to have had a different meaning in the modernist past. Franz Kaf-
ka, who felt entirely powerless in his relationship to his father, summed up his 
weakness in his Letter to his Father and turned his very weakness into a power-
ful weapon in the battle against him. This struggle was not only Oedipal. It was 
tantamount to rejecting the world of the adults, which he saw epitomized, just 
as the young Oskar in Günther Grass’s The Tin Drum, by business and the estab-
lishment. While he passionately expressed a sense of not belonging, he created 
the alternative space of the artist for himself, because, in the scale of modernist 
values the successful artist (who he already was) ranked higher than the suc-
cessful businessman. Art was universal whereas money was merely materially 
functional. Having the power of artistic imagery and articulation was superior 
to worldly power. 
It is inconceivable today that a son, armed only with artistic talent, could de-
feat corporate power whether it materializes in the figure of his father or oth-
erwise. Art is weak unless it functions on the level of a corporate agency. The 
László Fehér, Black Car, 1989, oil on canvas. 
Courtesy of the artist.
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term “modernism” entails the powerful artist with faith in the future that he 
will bring to mankind, but this faith and power are now history.33 Presently 
“modernism” as a concept appears to be teetering on the borderline between 
a restricted aesthetic-ideological category of the past, and a purely descriptive 
chronological rubric in historiography.
33 Just one example from the ocean of such references is Dieter Hacker’s recent exhibition 
in Berlin’ Diehl Gallery, accompanied by a text that puts modernism in perspective, titled 
“The Right Angle as a Socio-Political Art Concept.” (On view March 22-April 25, 2014.)
